Karl Marx Alienated Labor
We have proceeded from the premises of political economy. We have accepted
its language and its laws. We presupposed private property, the separation
of labour, capital and land, and of wages, profit of capital and rent of land-likewise
division of labour, competition, the concept of exchange-value, etc. On the
basis of political economy itself, in its own words, we have shown that the
worker sinks to the level of a commodity and becomes indeed the most wretched
of commodities; that the wretchedness of the worker is in inverse proportion
to the power and magnitude of his production; that the necessary result of
competition is the accu mulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the restoration
of monopoly in a more terrible form; that finally the distinction between
capitalist and land-rentier, like that between the tiller of the soil and
the factory-worker, disappears and that the whole of society must fall apart
into the two classes-the property-owners and the propertyless workers.
Political economy proceeds from the fact of private property, but it does
not explain it to us. It expresses in general, abstract formulae the material
process through which private property actually passes, and these formulae
it then takes for laws. It does not comprehend these lawsi .e., it does not
demonstrate how they arise from the very nature of private property. Political
economy does not disclose the source of the division between labour and capital,
and between capital and land. When, for example, it defines the relationship
of wages to profit, it takes the interest of the capitalists to be the ultimate
cause; i.e., it takes for granted what it is supposed to evolve. Sim* Similarly
competition comes in everywhere. It is explained from external circumstances.
As to how far these external and apparently fortuitous circumstances are but
the expression of a necessary course of development, political economy teaches
us nothing. We have seen how, to it, exchange itself appears to be a fortuitous
fact. The only wheels which political economy sets in motion are avarice and
the war amongst the avaricious-competition.
Do not let us go back to a fictitious primordial condition as the political
economist does, when he tries to explain. Such a primordial condition explains
nothing. He merely pushes the question away into a grey nebulous distance.
He assumes in the form of fact, of an event, what he is supposed to deduce-namely,
the necessary relationship between two things-between, for example, division
of labour and exchange. Theology in the same way explains the origin of evil
by the fall of man: that is, it assumes as a fact, in historical form, what
has to be explained.
We proceed from an actual economic fact.
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his
production increases in power and range. The worker becomes an ever cheaper
commodity the more commodities he creates. With the increasing value of the
world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world
of men. Labour produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker
as a commodity-and does so in the proportion in which it produces commodities
generally.
This fact expresses merely that the object which labour produces-labour's
product- confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer.
The product of labour is labour which has been congealed in an object, which
has become material: it is the objectification of labour. Labour' realization
is its objectification. In the co - conditions dealt with by political economy
this realization of labour appears as loss of reality for the workers; objectification
as loss of the object and object-bondage; appropriation as estrangement, as
alienation.
So much does labour's realization appear as loss of reality that the worker
loses reality to the point of starving to death. So much does objectification
appear as loss of the object that the worker is robbed of the objects most
necessary not only for his life but for his work. Indeed, labour itself becomes
an object which he can get hold of only with the greatest effort and with
the most irregular interruptions. So much does the appropriation of the object
appear as estrangement that the more objects the worker produces the fewer
can he possess and the more he falls under the dominion of his product, capital.
All these consequences are contained in the definition that the worker is
related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. For on this premise
it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the
alien objective world becomes which he creates over-against himself, the poorer
he himself-his inner world - becomes, the less belongs to him as his own.
It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains
in himself. The worker puts his life into the object- but now his life no
longer belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater this activity,
the greater is the worker's lack of objects. Whatever the product of his labour
is, he is not. Therefore the greater this product, the less is he himself.
The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour
becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him,
independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power of its
own confronting him; it means that the life which he has conferred on the
object confronts him as something hostile and alien.
Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labour
by not considering the direct relationship between the worker (labour) and
production. It is true that labour produces for the rich wonderful things-but
for the worker it produces privation. It produces palaces-but for the worker,
hovels. it produces beauty- but for the worker, deformity. It replaces labour
by machines-but some of the workers it throws back to a barbarous type of
labour, and the other workers it turns into machines. It produces intelligence-but
for the worker idiocy, cretinism.
The direct relationship of labour to its produce is the relationship of the
worker to the objects of his production. The relationship of the man of means
to the objects of production and to production itself is only a consequence
of this first relationship- and confirms it. We shall consider this other
aspect later.
When we ask, then, what is the essential relationship of labour we are asking
about the relationship of the worker to production.
Till now we have been considering the estrangement, the alienation of the
worker only in one of its aspects, i.e., the worker's relationship to the
products of his labour. But the estrangement is manifested not only in the
result but in the act of production-within the producing activity itself.
How would the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger,
were it not that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from
himself? The product is after all but the summary of the activity of production.
If then the product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active
alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. In the
estrangement of the object of labour is merely summarized the estrangement,
the alienation, in the activity of labour itself.
What, then, constitutes the alienation of labour?
First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong
to his essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself
but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely
his physical -6 and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind.
The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work
feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is
working he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced;
it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is
merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges
clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists,
labour is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates
himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the external
character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his
own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs,
not to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity
of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates
independently of the individual-that is, operates on him as an alien, divine
or diabolical activity-in the same way the worker's activity is not his spontaneous
activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self.
As a result, therefore, man (the worker) no longer feels himself to be freely
active in any but his animal functions-eating, drinking, procreating, or at
most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions
he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes
human and what is human becomes animal.
Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are also genuinely human functions.
But in the abstraction which separates them from the sphere of all other human
activity and turns them into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal.
We have considered the act of estranging practical human activity, labour,
in two of its aspects. (1) The relation of the worker to the product of labour
as an alien object exercising power over him. This relation is at the same
time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects of nature
as an alien world antagonistically opposed to him. (2) The relation of labour
to the act of production within the labour process. This relation is the relation
of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him;
it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating,
the worker's own physical and mental energy, his personal life or what is
life other than activity-as an activity which is turned against him, neither
depends on nor belongs to him. Here we have self-estrangement, as we had previously
the estrangement of the thing.
We have yet a third aspect of estranged labour to deduce from the two already
considered.
Man is a species being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts
the species as his object (his own as well as those of other things), but-and
this is only another way of expressing it-but also because he treats himself
as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and
therefore a free being.
The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in
the fact that man (like the animal) lives on inorganic nature; and the more
universal man is compared with an animal, the more universal is the sphere
of inorganic nature on which he lives. just as plants, animals, stones, the
air, light, etc., constitute a part of human consciousness in the realm of
theory, partly as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art-his
spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare
to make it palatable and digestible-so too in the realm of practice they constitute
a part of human life and human activity. Physically man lives only on these
products of nature, whether they appear in the form of food, heating, clothes,
a dwelling, or whatever it may be. The universality of man is in practice
manifested precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic
body-both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the
material, the object, and the instrument of his life-activity. Nature is man's
inorganic bodynature, that is, in so far as it is not itself the human body.
Man lives on nature-means that nature is his body, with which he must remain
in continuous intercourse if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual
life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for
man is a part of nature.
In estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions,
his lifeactivity, estranged labour estranges the species from man. It turns
for him the life of the species into a means of individual life. First it
estranges the life of the species and individual life, and secondly it makes
individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life of the species,
likewise in its abstract and estranged form.
For in the first place labour, life-activity, productive life itself, appears
to man merely as a means of satisfying a need-the need to maintain the physical
existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering
life. The whole character of a species-its species character-is contained
in the character of its life-activity; and free, conscious activity is man's
species character. Life itself appears only as a means to life.
The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity. It does not distinguish
itself from it. It is its life-activity. Man makes his life-activity itself
the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life-activity.
It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life-activity
directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity. It is just because of
this that he is a species being. Or it is only because he is a species being
that he is conscious Being, i.e., conscious that his own life is an object
for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. Estranged labour
reverses this relationship, so that it is just because man is a conscious
being that he makes his life activity, his essential being, a mere means to
his existence.