From Friedrich Fabri, Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien

Section 2

Colonies are nothing but the expression and echo of the enterprise and industry of the mother country; only a sound and flourishing citizenry, and a people with ambitions for continued expansion, can found viable daughter-states." This observation by Kapp (in. his "History of German Immigration into North America" ) sums up briefly and cogently both t e basic pre-condition for, and the economic significance of, colonial possessions. Every mighty State entity needs, at its prime, an area of expansion into which it can not only release its superfluous energies, but whose production, constantly flowing back to the mother country, it can absorb, and, in a vigorous process of reciprocation, augment by sending forth once again. No State which has ignored this law of expansion and reciprocation has in the long run achieved power and prosperity Even Germany's flowering during the Middle Ages was in large part based on the tremendous expansion of the German Hanse and of its centuries-long, energetic colonial policy which was directed towards the East and the Slavic lands. It was a bold deed when the Great Elector dared, in a poor country, gravely weakened by the effects of the terrible war years and with few and unfavourable coastal regions, to conceive the idea of an independent colonial policy and to try it out with settlements on the coast of Guinea. True, this small attempt was bound to fail at the time, because the region selected for settlement was a somewhat unfortunate one, but, above all, because the mother country as yet lacked the economic development at home and the surplus energy necessary for expansion overseas. But the great and energetic Elector of the, as yet, small principality had at least recognised that, without colonial possessions, a State cannot in the long run achieve riches and power. Genoa and Venice, Portugal and Spain, the Netherlands and Britain, bear witness to this in modern times. If the former quickly exhausted the resources of their colonies, and in recent times the unfitness of peoples of Latin stock as colonisers has become increasingly apparent, then this is all the more striking proof of the inevitability of their decay. There has long been a dearth in the Iberian Peninsula of surplus energies, and hence, for that reason alone, of the ability to maintain the vitality of overseas possessions. But it is today not only Britain and the Netherlands which proclaim to us the importance of colonial possessions; the United States and Russia too are in a most favourable position for large-scale colonial development. The United States per se, in the extension of their frontiers from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean; Russia, which after all already borders on China and Japan, in her vast territories in Northern and Central Asia. Both countries possess enough space to put to good use within their own borders for centuries to come all that stirs in them in the way of surplus energies. Nor is France lacking in opportunities for colonial enterprises. Her predominance in Algeria, which could probably be extended without difficulty to the other coastal States of North Africa, offers a rich field for colonial activity. True, the French national character is insufficiently endowed with either the desire or aptitude for the task. And the fact that the population increase in France is extremely slow and weak means that the French are under no pressure to remedy their colonial shortcomings." Even Austria, in so far as this internally disunited State, which in part is itself as yet very undeveloped, is capable of undertaking a cultural task of this kind, has a plenitude of such tasks at hand, on the Danube and in the Balkans. That she has recently had to suffer herself to be entirely pushed back from the Danube and outdone in the Balkans may, of course, be taken as a fairly clear sign that in Vienna they no longer themselves believe that Austria has either a political or a cultural task to fulfil.

Given this state of affairs, it is an all the more remarkable politico-economic fact that the country which in Europe today possesses the greatest capacity for expansion, that is to say, the most raid increase in population, and, in consequence, the largest number of emigrants, and which, at the same time, is, in virtue of the attributes of its national character, endowed with great, perhaps the greatest, aptitude for colonisation, should be devoid of any colonial possessions If we leave aside the Irish emigration to the United States, which stemmed from special circumstances which are to some degree already a thing of the past, then it is Germany who during the present century has provided by far the largest number of emigrants. Their number during the last 50 years is estimated to have been some 4,000,000 souls. F.H. Moldenhauer ("Reflections on Colonial and Emigration Questions", Frankfurt a. M., 1878) assesses the capital loss suffered by Germany as a result of this emigration - including of course the value of the lost labour - at 300,000,000 Marks annually at a conservative estimate, that is to say, a total of some 15,000,000,000 Marks. Whatever reservations one may have about such rough estimates, indubitably these figures represent a fact which is of the highest importance in terms of political economy In itself, the fact of large-scale emigration is not an unfavourable one, for not only is it evidence of a lively spirit of popular enterprise, but, given our marked population increase, it is all but essential. What is regrettable is only that, instead of becoming engaged in an active and profitable interchange with the mother country, this enormous capital value in labour and the goods produced by it is as good as entirely lost to the mother country, and benefits other nations, in the first place the United States.' "Our emigrants", says Roscher, "whethe they go to Canada or the United States, to Australia or Algeria, are regularly lost to the fatherland, together with everything that they have and are; they become customers and suppliers of foreign peoples, indeed, often enough our competitors and enemies." And H. Say compares our emigration "with the annual despatch of a well-equipped army, which, however, as soon as it crosses the frontier, becomes for ever lost to us"." The history of the peoples can show us nothing truly analogous to this strange, indeed unheard-of, state of affairs. What are all our tariff and financial problems, however important they may be in their own context, compared with the significance of our German emigration for the national economy! And is Germany really in a position calmly to tolerate this continuous outflow of energies, which is entirely unproductive for the mother country?

To pay, year in and year out, a vast levy in labour and capital to the outside world? Even though our emigration has of late slackened in consequence of the present state of business in North America, yet there is no question that, as soon as matters improve there and elsewhere, emigration will at once recommence on a vast scale. Indeed, already in the year 1878 it increased by comparison with the previous year .28 To the economic reasons for a rate of emigration which will soon increase mightily once again, there are now added many reasons of a political and moral nature. Conditions in Europe, not least in our fatherland, are so unstable and unsatisfying that for many they are making life more and more disagreeable. Our legislative tinkering, which, ceaselessly active, seeks to reduce everything to one level, and which, because it often creates untenable situations, is always busy with emendations and alterations, is creating an inner disquiet and ferment which is undermining all the certainties of national life and which has, indeed, aroused among the masses an unprecedented spirit of criticism and discontent. The more so since the principles of materialism, hostile not.only to religion but also to culture, have already been widely transmitted from the educated circles to the masses of the people. With this, of course, goes hand in hand the fact that the State too exerts its all-pervading control, often very arbitrarily, in every kind of religious and social connection, and excites and makes discontented those in the country who are otherwise quiet and quietest.'' Thus some of the Mennonites have emigrated (they are now also leaving Russia in relatively large numbers), and religious brotherhoods of many kinds are thinking of emigration and of finding a "refuge"; a phenomenon of the kind which usually occurs in times when great upheavals threaten." How could it, indeed, be otherwise when even men like Johannes Scherr prophesy disaster and say: "Our century will end with a revolution compared with which even that of 1789 will be child's play." At all events, these conditions and states of mind, which we only touch on in passing here, carry in them a predisposing factor which will make many people more willing to consider emigrating.

Yet, whilst we lay emphatic stress on the extraordinary importance of our German emigration, we have here really discussed the result without having first cast light upon its cause. This cause, however, lies at bottom in the rapid increase in the population of Germany. "It has already today been established", says A. Zehlicke (in his essay "The Law of Population in Germany", in the periodical "In the New Reich", 1877, No. 29), "that the annual rate of increase in Germany is rising from 1 %< per cent to 1 1/2 per cent, that is to say, given the present level of population, that, after subtracting deaths, the surplus on 43 million people amounts, not to 540,000, but 650,000 annually. What, compared with the current increase, does an annual emigration of 50,000 persons signify? Indeed, it is not unlikely that immigration from Austria, Russia, Britain etc. may be keeping pace with this level of emigration. Germany has already reached the stage where she can compare herself with North America in regard to increase in population. Whereas Prussia on her own doubled her population over the period 1820-1860, that is to say in the space of forty years, whilst together with the rest of Germany it took her fifty years to double it (latterly because the process was being markedly accelerated by freedom of movement, freedom of employment, etc.), in present conditions Germany only needs thirty years for the doubling of her population. If we assume that in the year 1870 there were some 40 million inhabitants, then, if conditions continue the same as they have been in Germany since that decade, the population of the German Reich will, at the end of the century, in the year 1900, amount to 80 million.

Indeed, a truly frightening prospect; glittering perhaps to those who measure the strength of a State in terms of the number of recruits available, but who forget that already Frederick the Great said that money was the most- indispensable requisite for modern war. Now we do admittedly believe that Zehlicke goes a good deal too far in the above citation. We are not told what formula his calculation is based on. According to Euler's method of calculation, given an annual rate of increase of 1'/z per cent, the population will only double itself in 47 years. We can probably leave it at 40 years, particularly as the pressures of the times may be expected to find expression in reduced numbers of marriages and other effects tending towards a slower increase in population. But if we assume, instead of 80 million, only some 65 million for the year 1900, then even this probability opens up disquieting prospects. For even this assumption surely leads with inexorable logic to the following prognosis: rising imports of grain and cattle, because German agricultural production will become ever less capable of meeting home demand; in consequence; a rise in food prices and hence in all other prices; in addition, a constant decrease in wages, because of the annually increasing availability of labour; a fall in industrial and business production resulting from an accelerating decline in the national income, that is to say, increasing inability to save, and, in consequence, decreasing purchasing power, or, in a word: a rapid growth in pauperism and in social distress. Is it saying too much if we assert: Here lies the root cause of our social crisis, and all attempts at what is called solving the social question which do not make an energetic start at this point are bound to fail to achieve any adequate results? What is the use of all the reforms in our tariff and trade policy (which, since they are by definition designed for defence against the rest of the world, must therefore, if, they are not to inflict fresh injury, operate only within narrow limits), if the basis of our national prosperity is rapidly sinking year by year? If, moreover, as is said to be seriously under consideration, grain (and cattle) tariffs were to be introduced, then this would greatly worsen the dismal perspective, described above. For there is scarcely need of proof that, in view of the increasing over-population in Germany, in view of the resultant need constantly to increase the imports of foreign grain, a tariff on grain (as on cattle), which would be bound to increase the prices of the most essential foodstuffs far beyond the amount of customs dues which would be levied, would be a highly dangerous undertaking. It would be most regrettable if the re- form of our tariff and taxation policy, which has become inevitable, were to start with measures of this kind. One would think, indeed, that history existed, among other things, in order that one people might learn from another, and that, for instance, the great struggle which took place in Britain some 30 years ago over the Corn Laws" would have helped to decide this question for all other modern, civilised States in essentially the same economic situation. It seems, however, that we shall have to fight out this question once again in Germany from scratch, albeit probably at a more rapid pace, because we shall be suffering losses. But to be thinking of such expedients as the imposition of grain and cattle tariffs at all is presumably only possible today because the crux of our economic problems, overpopulation and its consequences, is not sufficiently recognised and given its proper weight in the judgement of public opinion. People, indeed, complain that this time there is no end to the economic crisis. Admittedly many causes contribute to this, some of which will disappear in time. But of what use will that be if the root cause continues to grow at a tremendous rate here in Germany? Johannes Scherr, the prophet of doom, may very well be proved right, for how is asocial revolution to be prevented here unless this point is tackled without delay and perseveringly !

But how can this be done? If it is a matter of counteracting the evil effects of a rapid population increase, then surely there are only three ways of combating them. It is argued that over-population begins at the point where the import of essential foodstuffs exceeds exports. This is undoubtedly correct, but this one criterion is not sufficient. A country can be-compelled to import large quantities of foodstuffs without the evil effects of the start of over-population making themselves felt there. If, for instance, that country's industrial and business production and the sale thereof are so large and steady that it can not only easily pay for its imports of foodstuffs, but also preserve its purchasing and saving capacity, or even increase its national prosperity. This is at bottom what has so far occurred in Britain. But as long as this is the case, no-one complains about overpopulation, indeed it goes almost unnoticed. If, however, industrial production falters, and employment and earnings fall sharply, then the disaster of overpopulation is bound to become ever more apparent, whilst dearth and pauperism rapidly spread; then also the almost universally accepted equation of a country's rapid population increase with, its "prosperity" is only partially correct. The relevance of the foregoing to Germany's present situation is self-evident. Every year our agricultural production satisfies a smaller proportion of domestic demandc " and our industrial and commercial production long ago fell to an unprecedented level of stagnation and is now at a very low ebb. A substantial increase in agricultural production can only take place very slowly and within narrowly defined limits, much too slowly to keep pace in any way with the growing over-population. But it is likely that our industrial production too will be wholly inadequate to this task. If we assume that during the next ten years it will have recovered, through a process of slow and sound development, to a point where it will be able once again to employ as many persons as it did in 1873 - an assumption which is probably too optimistic, particularly in view of the present general trend towards protectionism and reciprocal closing off of markets - then in another decade there will be so many million more people in Germany to feed, to clothe and to educate. Thus industry and commerce will be equally unable, even in the most favourable case, fully to overcome the dearth once it has occurred. Hence we urgently need another, a third way: emigration. Indeed, we are forced to say that the organising of large-scale German emigration has become a vital necessity for the German Reich. We urgently need emigration on a significant annual scale - Zehlicke thinks it should amount to at least 300,000 persons, whilst during the last few decades it has at most amounted to some 200,000 per year, and in 1878 it stood at about 80,000, half of which was probably cancelled out by immigration - if the dangers arising from our over-population are to be to some extent overcome. How vast a socio-political task thus confronts us, is self-evident. Mere passivity, that is to say, leaving it to chance whether annually so many thousand continue to emigrate to North America etc. or no, will in the long run surely be impossible. Large-scale emigration to the United States, moreover, now constitutes for Germany a very considerable disadvantage, and one which had not yet come into existence in the 60's.°° Although North America, which will for years to come be safe from over-population and which has been endowed with a most favourable economic position, for a long time did not need an industry looking to the world market and developed in every aspect, the United States have nevertheless, during the last decade, under the protection of a prohibitive tariff system - which it was much easier to introduce there without disadvantage than it would be for any continental Power - now created a mighty domestic industry and have thus almost entirely excluded exports from Germany {as from Britain)." Indeed, North America is already beginning to export her products more and more to Europe. Although we do not go so far as to share the anxiety, which has already been expressed, that the United States may, once their manufacture of cotton goods has further gained in strength, one day even impose a heavy duty on cotton exports - something which, admittedly, given the experiences of the past twelve years, cannot be regarded as altogether impossible - yet we would wish here to underline the fact that in future large-scale emigration from Germany to the United States will harm Germany doubly. Not only negatively, as being an outflow of people and capital which becomes unproductive for Germany, but also positively, in that our emigrants will no longer, as previously, be producing in the main only foodstuffs, but rather will offer North American industry a rich variety of cheap labour and will thus make it all the easier for that industry to compete with German industry in every branch. Thus German emigration, which will inevitably increase, will, if it is not organised and channelled into German-owned agricultural colonies, in future play a direct and powerful part in the economic impoverishment of Germany. It is true that, in supposed disproof of the assumption of a dangerously growing overpopulation, stress has often been laid on the fact that there is almost no emigration from our over-populated industrial regions. But this is to overlook the fact that emigration is naturally most marked from areas where labour is worst paid. It is therefore entirely understandable that it is not our over-populated industrial regions, but our most thinly populated agrarian districts with relatively poorly productive soils and large landed estates which furnish the largest proportion of emigrants.

That organised emigration of the kind we need should, apart from its economic significance, also involve important national considerations, is something that we would only touch on in passing, whilst asking: Must our brothers and compatriots who cross the seas always continue to assimilate themselves to our Anglo-Saxon cousins, thus rapidly losing language and nationality, or must they even, in the down-at-heel overseas communities of those of Latin stock, in many cases allow themselves to be treated with indignity as illegitimate intruders? Does there not arise here, in the national context too, a question of vital importance for the German Reich? If the German Reich Government should prove in the long run unable or unwilling to approach with insight and energy the question of organising and managing our system of emigration, then they would without doubt be doing the gravest harm to the normal development of our national prosperity and our political strength.

But what is meant by the management and organisation of our emigration system? Since it is not possible to prescribe destinations, this demand means no less than the creation, where possible, under the German ° flag, of conditions in foreign countries for our emigrants which will enable them not only to prosper in economic terms, but also, whilst preserving their language and nationality, to maintain an active national and economic interchange with the mother country. In other words, embarking intelligently and energetically upon a genuine colonial policy is the only effective means of transforming German emigration from an outflow of energies into an inflow of both economic and political energies. At this point, however, before continuing with the next stage in our argument, ehoves us to set forth certain fundamental considerations concerning colonies and colonial policy.

There exist today two fundamental forms of colonial possession, which are categorised as agrarian colonies and trading colonies. The older form, adopted by the seafarers of the Latin peoples in the shape of what we would rather call colonies of exploitation, has now been universally abandoned, because in practice condemned." Spain and Portugal have shown us that it is not colonial possessions in themselves that make us rich, but that rather, when the proper, intelligent colonial policy, adapted to the time and place, is lacking, when exploitation in the form of despoliation, with its brief, illusory flowering, comes to its rapid end, when it does not stimulate and increase the productive capacity of the mother country, then it can even deplete and impoverish that mother country. The above-mentioned two present-day fundamental forms of colonial possession are, however, because of geographic and/or climatic conditions, firmly and unalterably circumscribed in all quarters of the globe. Agrarian colonies are only possible in temperate zones, and these - apart from special conditions such as high altitudes or favourably structured coastlands - are on the whole confined to the non-tropical regions. To put it another way, one could say that where climatic fevers prevail a natural limit is set upon the activities of the European farmer and cattle-breeder. In view of this geographical constraint one could, therefore, speak of sub-tropical colonies instead of agrarian colonies. If we leave aside Central Asia, Japan and Northern China, which already constitute coherent political communities, in some cases very old ones, then it is North America, a portion of the southern half of South America, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and perhaps a few of the archipelagos of the Pacific which qualify as agrarian colonies properly speaking. In consequence of a providential dispensation in the ordering of historical development, these great expanses of territory have for millennia been preserved for the white race to enjoy in times to come. The aboriginal inhabitants, belonging for the most part to the so-called red race, are without exception hunters and cattlebreeders, hence their population numbers are exceedingly small and they were destined to keep these regions reserved until such time as the white man should find his way to them and compress their ever-diminishing numbers into everdecreasing territories. The geology and climate and the resultant soil conditions prevailing in these extensive land-masses, however, point to agriculture as the natural basis for the development pre-ordained for them. Thus it was only the white man, turning to the plough instead of to the hunt, who was able with industry and labour gradually to open up these lands for the development of civilisation.

From his section on Trading Colonies

The basic character of the trading colonies is, as has been shown, governed by their being situated in the tropic and the method of their administration and exploitation is the more efficacious the more it is adapted to these natural givens. As in the climatic characteristics, so too in the ethnographic respect, we encounter a sharply defined distinction between trading and agrarian colonies. Whilst the former have but a thinly distributed native population, we find in the latter, the tropical colonies, a massive population of in part black, and in part brown skin colouring. Able to derive the few necessities of life without effort from nature's generous store, the basic character of this population - speaking here, of course, in quite general terms - is more or less lax, carefree and languid. Only in contact with and under the guidance of the European does the aptitude for work of the inhabitant of the tropics likewise gain in staying-power, his attitude became more resolute, his spiritual life grow capable of a higher degree of moral and cultural development. Hence in the tropical lands the rule of the European is indispensable if these lands are to be drawn into the orbit of the modern cultural movement or to be kept within it> Agrarian colonies, settled by white men, can, at a certain stage in their development, very well be left to themselves, when they may turn into mighty states; trading colonies can never be left to themselves, that is to say, to the native population, without at once degenerating If Britain, if the Netherlands, were today to give up their Indian colonial possessions, then the exporting capacity of these rich lands would before long sink to the lowest possible level, struggle and dispute would once again, as in earlier times, flare up between the various peoples and faiths, and these territories, so significant today, would soon lose their importance for the general civilising movement altogether. The negro republics of [Santo] Domingo (Haiti) and Liberia afford striking examples of what becomes of tropical colonies when left to themselves." In the agrarian colonies, and indeed wherever a certain degree of intelligence, of moral and economic progress, has already become common ground in wider circles, laisser faire possesses a certain validity, but in tropical trading colonies it would be the stupidest. idea which one could possibly entertain. Just as the European market has long, and to a constantly increasing degree, had need of the tropics and their products, so also the founding of every new trading colony is a contribution to the general progress of civilisation. These colonies, however, require constant European supervision, though this should be animated, not by a violent lust for power, but by intelligent foresight and true humanity In this respect too, Britain, is more and more following, in an exemplary manner, paths that are right and beneficial; and the enhancement of the economic prosperity as well as of the intellectual progress of the native population, which during the last few decades has been particularly apparent in the British Indies, is highly gratifying. And, as it does in respect of trade and all business enterprises, so too the colonial government accords the greatest possible measure of freedom to all humane and religious activities. It is, however, by no means purely commercial gain alone which makes the tropical colonies valuable to the mother country. The strengthening and enlargement of .the shipping of the mother country which is bound to occur as a' result of rich overseas possessions is also an important factor The present-day volume of trade between Britain and the British East Indies alone is, according to Moldenhauer's figures, greater than the entire overseas trade, than the operations of Germany's entire merchant navy. Three decades ago Germany (like Holland) still had a shipping trade with the Cape Colony; in the past twenty years or so - apart from an occasional emigrant ship sailing from Hamburg - this has entirely disappeared." Thus everywhere the fact is apparent that even the shipping trade of another country, although on a footing of complete equality with that between a powerful mother country and its colonies, cannot in the long run compete successfully. But the possession of rich colonies furnishes yet another, much more far- reaching advantage. The whole of national life in all sections of the population is enhanced, enlivened and enriched by continuous contact with colonial possessions. It is true that trading colonies are never the goal of emigration as such, but nevertheless there does take place a steady, beneficial ebb and flow of certain sections of the population between the mother country and the colonies; primarily from the middle and upper levels of the population. Merchants, officials, military men, technicians, tradespeople, divines and missionaries, teachers and scholars in their thousands move back and forth in a steady stream -~ The great majority of these people are out to make money, and many of them attain their goal and return home after ten or twenty years of work with their more or less rich gains. Whilst in agrarian colonies this return to the mother country of those who have become rich and prosperous only occurs in exceptional cases, in trading colonies it is the rule. Britain today has hundreds of thousands, Holland tens of thousands of her native sons in her-colonies, a floating population which, at intervals averaging some ten to fifteen years, constantly renews itself through in- and outflow. It is clear that this constant circulation, continuing over a long period, indeed over centuries, is bound to prove a most fruitful source of national prosperity. There is no doubt that - in proportion to its size and number of inhabitants - Holland today possesses the largest capital reserves in the world. This low-lying land, which in terms of soil is among the poorest spots on earth, which is half sand and heath, and the other half of which, with its fertile marshes, had to be effortfully wrested from the sea and can be defended against that sea year in and year out only by labour and financial sacrifice. The solution to this paradox lies simply and solely in Holland's once so mighty activity at sea, in her trade which today is still important, and in the exploitation of her rich colonies. Similarly, for Britain too, her colonies which famish the products of all the [climatic] zones .are the real source of her capital wealth and of her power.

In the days of Queen Elizabeth Germany's prosperity (as also, probably, the density of her population) far outstripped that of Great Britain. In the ensuing two centuries, during which, chiefly in consequence of the Thirty Years' War, Germany lay almost completely crushed, in economic as in political terms, this ratio was completely reversed. The retrogression here, one could say, was as great as the political and economic progress there. ~3ritain's seafaring, her acquisition of rich colonies, the resultant growing trade, and finally her industrial development, based, entirely correctly and soundly, on these pre-conditions, are, as is plain to see, the sources of Britain's greatness and power. No less important that the immediate economic gain, however, is, as has already been indicated, the significance of this interchange between mother country and colony for the general development of a nation. Where in Britain is there a family of any size which does not have many of its closest kin occupying the most various positions in life, somewhere in the British colonies that circle the globe! What a wealth of influences on the spirit of the nation lies in this one fact which has now been operative for centuries! Just as, whilst widening interests, it widens vision, so also a knowledge of the sea and the need to make one's way in all manner of walks of life strengthens the character and gives our Anglo-Saxon cousins that practical insight and that confidence of bearing which differentiate them so markedly from the inhabitants of our continental States. This national characteristic, it is true, rarely manifests itself in an exterior of captivating amiability; but whoever succeeds in penetrating more deeply into its nature and being will usually find, even under an often brusque and forbidding appearance, a great store of competence, reliability and strength. It is clear that the typical characteristics of the seafarer have contributed much to the British national character. It is, however, worthy of note that in Germany it is only in our Hanse towns, in Bremen and Hamburg, with their commercial brains, their spirit of enterprise, their success at sea and their extensive overseas connections, that we also glimpse a pleasing resemblance to the British national character.

If we review what has been sketched out above concerning tr ing colonies, then an unprejudiced assessment will lead to the firm conclusion that~he acquisition of trading colonies is an imperative necessity for the German Reich.'~In order to refute this conclusion it would be necessary to prove that our entire train of argument is based on false premises. Me while, however, we shall here once again confidently repeat our assertion tha it is above all economic, and, deriving from them, political and national-psychological considerations which make it incumbent upon. the German Reich to pursue an intelligent and energetic colonial policy.)Our German industry is suffering from the serious disadvantage of having developed much too rapidly. It lacked the firm foundations upon which it could, with some degree of steadiness, slowly and surely have built up its network of markets. There is no doubt that in this connection, apart from sales in the mother country, it is colonies with a strong purchasing capacity which are of first importance. These we entirely lack. To this is at once added another evil. The rapid growth of our German industry occurred at a time when the principle of free trade seemed to have gained a decisive victory in all the civilised countries. How deceptive this expectation was to prove!

The United States, the most profitable market for our young industry, suddenly closed its doors, and, despite its free democratic institutions, inaugurated a tariff policy which made a mockery of all modem views and which all but destroyed our exports to North America. Shrewd political economists might years ago have seen cause for grave concern in this circumstance, as an ominous portent foreshadowing dangerous crises; and indeed, it has rightly been observed that the earliest origins of the present general crisis are to be found already in the American Civil War." But we gaily continued with laisser faire, as if all the gateways of the world were bound to remain permanently open to our products. When finally there came the fatal shower of goldbz 'which conjured up visions of riches where none were, when the economic orgies of the Granderzeit threw all healthy relations of production into wild confusion, often senselessly increased luxury [consumption], and gave rise among the masses of the workers to a greed and a quite logically resultant inner discontent, the like of which have scarcely ever been known before in the history of the peoples, then indeed: the crash could be seen everywhere at once. Britain, when the United States market was closed to her too, drew the commercial tie with her colonies all the tighter, and with the means which, as the mother country, as the most powerful sea-going and trading State, she had abundantly at her disposal despite all the talk about free trade, she, too, more and more excluded foreign manufactures. At the same time, however, she threw her own surpluses onto our markets, which lay fully open to her, and, with the superior weight of her industrial productive capacity,she completely depressed Germany's production.' ss France, however, who was so fortunate as to be protected from the period of delirium and its effects by her defeats, went to work seriously and energetically and was indeed soon competing with Germany more formidably than ever. Thus German industry was everywhere seeking admission and not finding it; and it was quite natural that in these circumstances it was obliged to have recourse to the much deprecated expedient, "cheap and shoddy".

From his section on Penal Colonies

Unfortunately, we are here compelled to reinforce with one final argument the important considerations that make it a matter of urgency for Germany to acquire colonies. Apart from the two basic categories described above, namely those of agrarian and of trading colonies, there is yet a third, quite peculiar variety: that o€ the penal colonies. This is not the place to enter into the numerous arguments which have been set forth both for and against this institution from the point of view of the administration of criminal law, of the imposition of punishment, and of the amelioration of the system. It will suffice to mention the fact that in Siberia Russia long ago created for herself a prison which is not only extremely large, but which also produces the best possible results. She sends an annual average of some 15,000 people to Siberia. Apart from those condemned to work in the mines, the lot of the deportees on the whole soon becomes a favourable one. Usually living together with their families, they rapidly transform themselves into colonists and their material circumstances are satisfactory. .......

There is a political consideration, too, which argues for action along these lines. It may have been thought surprising that, when our new German criminal code was drawn up, banishment, the most natural and appropriate form of punishment for political transgressions, found no place in it. It is true that, by a strange irony of fate, and as if to show up this omission for what it is, immediately after the introduction of our new criminal code, banishment was nevertheless imposed upon a certain category of German citizens, purely by means of an exceptional law, and, moreover, without any court proceedings." Mention of this is, however, made only in passing, because there is an intrinsic connection between banishment and deportation and, if this system of punishment were to be included in our criminal code, and also made applicable to certain political crimes, banishment would of course become deportation. Here it is primarily the latter which we have in mind, and there is also, alas, a most regrettable political argument in favour of its application. It is, indeed, one of the saddest characteristics of our times that during the past decade revolutionary parties have emerged in almost all the major States of Europe, parties which have consciously, indeed provocatively, declared war alike upon the state, society, and religion as at present constituted. Our semi-official "Provinzial-Correspondenz" recently diagnosed this fact as follows: "The public is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that a network of secret revolutionary contacts has spread out all over Europe." It is, however, apparent to all that it is in the German Reich that this revolutionary propaganda is most widely disseminated and most tightly organised. It is true that a repressive law has now been promulgated which has broken up the public organisation and has most comprehensively suppressed the whole of the agitatory activity of our anarchists.'° No intelligent person, however, will believe that this has dispelled all danger, or removed for all time the possibility of an attempt at the forcible overthrow of the existing order. This is all the more unlikely because the movement in question has not only already established itself, particularly among the working masses, to the accompaniment of that kind of fanaticism that stems from wild enthusiasm, but has also taken on a distinctly international character and can count many thousands of sympathisers in France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland and Russia. Supposing, then, that when the moment appeared opportune, violent attempts at revolution might take place in Germany, too, like those undertaken by the Commune in the spring of 1871," and that, after a possibly bloody struggle, thousands and tens of thousands, here in Germany too, would suddenly have to be brought to justice, would not such a sad eventuality confront the Reich Government with an insoluble dilemma? What to do with the thousands under sentence, given our already quite inadequate and overcrowded prisons? There would simply be no other alternative than that which France adopted with her deportations to New Caledonia. With well-intentioned generosity, a suitable island - called, perhaps, Utopia - could be allotted to the Communards for purposes of self-government, so that their programme of universal happiness could for once somewhere be put into practice, and to the test. But in order to be able to take such a course, Germany would already have had to have acquired appropriately situated colonial possessions. Did not Britain, the always practical, at once counter the revolutionary attempts of Irish Fenianism with deportation, thus rapidly succeeding in suppressing the movement?